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Abstract: This paper presents applications of the trope of the locked and sealed 
piggy-bank into which the secret can be easily inserted but from which it cannot be 
withdrawn without opening the box.  We present a basic two-pass cryptographic 
scheme that can serve as template for a variety of implementations. Together with 
the sealed piggy-bank is sent a coded letter that lists and certifies the contents of the 
box. We show how this idea can help increase the security of cryptographic 
protocols for classical systems as well as those based on “single-state” systems.  
More specifically, we propose the use of a hashing digest (instead of the coded 
letter) to detect loss of key bits to the eavesdropper and use in communication 
systems where error correction is an important issue.  
 
Introduction 
The idea of locking a secret in a box and letting it be carried to the destination by an 
unreliable courier (Figure 1) (where it is unlocked by the recipient who has the key 
to unlock the box) is at the basis of most cryptographic protocols. This scheme 
assumes that the key has somehow been transported to the recipient in advance of 
the communication. The lock of the box is protected by placing a seal across it that 
ensures that it is not tampered with by the courier.   
In the case of the use of this scheme in data communication, the key may be 
transmitted over a side channel. If the rate at which the key is transmitted over the 
side channel equals the data rate, then this constitutes the unbreakable one-time 
pad [1]. 
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  Figure 1. Sending a secret in a locked box  
(unlocking needs key K) 
 
Another idea is that of the three-stage protocol (Figure 2) which can be used 
when the recipient does not possess a copy of the key. This requires that both 
parties use locks and it is assumed that the locks are protected by tamper-proof 
seals of the two parties. In this protocol Alice puts the secret in a locked box which is 
transported to Bob who puts his own lock on the box and sends it back to Alice who 
unlocks her lock and resends the box to Bob who then unlocks his lock. This 
protocol ensures that both Alice and Bob can check that their locks have not been 
tampered with. Amongst other applications, this idea is at the basis of the three-
stage quantum cryptography protocol [2]. 
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                    Figure 2. Sending a secret in a locked box using separate locks  
by Alice (Ka) and Bob (Kb); locked box shown as  
 
Although the locked box is the most popular foundational unit of traditional 
secure systems, it is not the only one. Another basic unit, with lesser popularity in 
formal arrangements but equally great popularity in informal systems, is that of the 
piggy-bank (Figure 3) in which coins or money can be easily inserted but not 
withdrawn without access to the key with which it has been locked. 
 
 
Jehoiada the priest took a chest, and bored a hole in the lid of it, and set it beside the 
altar, on the right side as one cometh into the house of the LORD: and the priests that 
kept the door put therein all the money that was brought into the house of the LORD. -- 
2 Kings 12.9 
 
We propose that use of such a locked box with a receptacle for insertion of 
money (or secrets) can be the model for cryptographic systems. Although used for 
collecting money at a public location, the box was sometimes moved to another 
location for counting the money and bills. 
 
 
 
                                   
(a)                             (b)                                (c)       (d) 
               
Figure 3. (a) A piggy bank; (b)A temple money box; (b) Tang Dynasty piggy bank from China; 
(c) piggy bank from Majapahit Indonesia (14th-15th century) (National Museum of Indonesia, 
Jakarta) 
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The piggy bank trope 
Bob sends an empty locked piggy bank to Alice. When she receives it, Alice deposits 
the secret (money, bills, and jewels) into the box together with the decryption key of 
a coded letter. In addition, she prepares a letter to be sent separately. The piggy 
bank and the letter are sent back to Bob. 
The letter is required to authenticate the contents of the locked piggy bank 
box. It cannot be in plaintext because the content list itself is a secret. The letter is 
needed to establish the identity of the person who has sent the secret (that is Alice) 
and this may carry an additional secret.  
Bob opens the box, obtains the secret, and also reads the coded letter which 
has further details of the secrets in it. 
This protocol is described in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
              Figure 4. The piggy bank cryptographic trope; the secret letter 
is represented by   
  
 The idea of sending two pieces of secret information in partitions was used 
earlier by the author in the different context of visual cryptography [3]. In the case 
where Bob’s ability to read the “secret letter” is limited, he will be able to obtain 
only one of the two secrets.  
 The piggy bank trope can be implemented in many variations by making 
further assumptions about the system. Here we provide a few where standard 
primitives are employed. 
 
Protocol 1 
In this implementation of the piggy bank protocol for data, Bob obtains both the 
secrets K and S. The protocol consists of three steps of Figure 5: 
 
Step 1. Bob starts with a random number R and the piggy bank transformation is 
represented by a one-way transformation f(R) = Re mod n, where n is a composite 
number with factors known only to him; e is the publicly known encryption 
exponent.  
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Step 2. Bob sends f(R) to Alice who multiplies it with her first secret S.   Alice sends 
S(R)e + K mod n to Bob in one communication and f(S) = Se mod n in another 
communication. 
 
Step 3. Bob uses his secret inverse transformation to first recover S and having 
found it he can recover K. 
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       Figure 5. The piggy bank protocol 1 for communications 
 
Example 1. Let n= 51 and the public encrypting exponent is e=3 (with the secret 
decrypting algorithm being 11 since 3×11 = 1 mod φ(51) ). Bob chooses random 
R=13 and sends 133 mod 51 = 4 to Alice. 
 Alice’s random secrets are S=5 and K=29. Alice computes 4×5+29= 49 and 
sends it and also 53 mod 51 = 23 to Bob. 
 Bob uses his secret decryption exponent to recover S: 2311 mod 51 = 5. Thus 
5×4+K =49, from which he recovers K. 
 
Three Variations on Protocol 1:  
 
These variations require correspondingly appropriate actions by Bob. 
 
1. Take R=1. This means that Alice sends S+K mod n and Se mod n.  
2. Alice sends ReS mod n and Se mod n to Bob. 
3. Bob sends R to Alice who, in turn, sends SeR+K mod n and Se mod n to 
Bob. 
4. Bob sends R to Alice who, in turn, sends SR+K mod n and Ke mod n to Bob. 
 
 
Protocol 2 
This implementation where Bob obtains only one of the two secrets. The two parties 
also obtain an additional shared random number. The protocol consists of the 
following steps: 
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Step 1. Bob starts with a random number R and the piggy bank transformation is 
represented by a one-way transformation f. The transformation could be 
exponentiation of a publicly announced generator g of the elements of the 
multiplicative group modulo p, which is a prime. 
 
Step 2. Bob sends f(R) to Alice who conjoins it with the secret S that she wishes to 
send to Bob and then performs the transformation f. It is assumed that f(S*f(R)) = 
f(SR), so as to see the operations performed by Bob and Alice to be similar.   Now 
Alice sends f(S*f(R))+K to Bob which is equivalent to f(SR)+K as well as f(S) 
separately. 
 
Step 3. Bob performs f(R*f(S)) which is equivalent to f(SR) since he knows the value 
of R. Now he subtracts it from f(SR)+K and, thereby, obtains K. 
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     Figure 6. The piggy bank protocol 2 for communications; f(Sf(R))=f(SR) 
 
In a variant of this protocol, Alice sends K×f(Sf(R))+K and f(S) to Bob, although this 
does not provide any special advantage.  
 
An implementation of the protocol is given in Figure 6. 
 
Example 2. Let f(x)=gx mod p, where p is prime. Let p=37, g=2, and R=11. Therefore, 
Bob sends 211 mod 37 = 13. 
Let Alice’s secrets be S=3 and K=10. Alice generates 133 mod 37 = 14 and 
sends 14 + K that equals 24 and also 2S mod 37= 8.  
 Bob computes (2S)11 mod 37 and obtains 14. Subtracting this from 24, he 
obtains the secret K to be equal to 10. 
 Alice and Bob also come to share the random number gSR mod p that could be 
used for some other cryptographic purpose. 
 
Like protocol 1, protocol 2 can be implemented in other variations including one of 
the secrets is conjoined with the other encrypted terms in a multiplicative way 
(rather than the additive way shown here). It may also be generalized. The secret 
letter may be replaced by a hashing digest in certain situations (as in the application 
to quantum cryptography described below).  
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Hashing digests in quantum cryptography 
The piggy bank trope may be applied to quantum cryptography [4]-[6] although this 
cannot be done in quite the same way as in the protocols above. Specifically, we can 
use the second “letter” communication from Alice to Bob to send a hashing digest of 
the key to determine if the bits have been correctly received.  
Consider the communications [7]-[9] and signal-to-noise (SNR) perspectives 
on cryptography [10]. The BB84 protocol requires that single photons be sent by 
Alice to Bob [11], but the ability to receive single photons means that the SNR ratio 
for the receiver is infinite and the channel is fully protected. With such transmission 
requirements, there may very well be no need to use encryption! 
 In BB84 we could do away with complicated error correction, like “cascade”, 
to counter the eavesdropper if the resources for computing commonly available on 
the network are harnessed to send side information.  
In cascade, the sifted key bits are divided into blocks and then both parties 
announce the parity of each of these blocks on a public channel. If Alice’s parity for a 
block differs from Bob’s, it is clear that there are an odd number of errors in that 
block. The search for these errors is done recursively, by dividing the block into 
smaller ones, until only an even number is contained in that block. When the blocks 
have been processed, the bits are shuffled and the procedure repeated. This is done 
a number of times, so that the probability that the remaining key contains an error 
is very low.  
Instead of the cascade procedure, a cryptographically strong hash digest of 
the raw key can be sent to Bob to ascertain if the eavesdropper has siphoned off any 
photons or if noise has led to any errors. This digest may be sent separately to the 
destination quite like the “coded letter” of Figure 4. If the digest generated by Bob 
doesn’t match the one he has received from Alice, he asks for a retransmission of the 
bits. 
 In the use of hashing as a resource, the hash digest may be shared amongst 
the users on a side-channel since it is assumed that bandwidth is not limited. The 
BB84 protocol assumes that the data is being transmitted by single objects 
(photons) for if more than one photon is transmitted for each bit, the eavesdropper 
can siphon off the superfluous bit to obtain partial information about the key being 
transmitted. Of course, not all quantum cryptography systems use single photons as 
evidenced by the three-stage protocol using random rotations [2]. But even here the 
number of photons in each communication must be restricted so that the 
eavesdropper does not have information to determine the polarizations in each of 
the three links. 
 It is true that the use of the hashing digest will not prevent the eavesdropper 
from disrupting the communication. 
  
Discussion 
This paper has shown how the trope of the piggy bank can have cryptographic 
applications in communications and key-distribution systems. We have provided 
examples of basic use in classical and quantum cryptography. Further variations on 
the protocols provided in this paper may be easily developed. 
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